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Banning Short Sales and Market Quality:  
The UK’s Experience 
 
Abstract:   
We study the effects that the ban on short sales of shares in financial firms introduced in late 2008 and 
removed early 2009 had on the microstructure and the quality of UK equity markets. We show that 
the ban did nothing to affect order flows: financial stocks were being more aggressively sold off than 
their peers pre-ban and this situation persisted through the ban period. Trading volume in financials 
was massively reduced, however. The ban also decimated order book liquidity for financials. The 
deterioration was symmetric, affecting the limit buy and limit sell side of the order book equally. 
Finally we show that, through the period of the ban, markets for financial stocks were substantially 
less efficient and that the role of the trading process in aiding price discovery was greatly reduced. 
The effects identified above were largely reversed once the ban was lifted. The persistence of the 
deterioration in market quality and liquidity though the relatively long-lasting UK ban on short selling 
suggest that other major market developments such as the TARP program were not responsible since 
these were concentrated in the early half of the ban.  We thus argue that the short selling ban was 
responsible for detrimental effects on the quality of UK equity markets and that, far from being 
stabilising, the ban exacerbated problems in valuing UK financial stocks. 
 
JEL classification: G14, G18 
Keywords: short-selling, liquidity, market efficiency  
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1. Introduction 
Short selling is the practice of selling a security that an agent does not own. Speculators short sell a 
security with the intention of buying it back at a later date at a lower price, so as to profit from a price 
decline.1  While frequently attracting ire from executives of companies subjected to short selling 
pressuresthe practice, some form of short selling is usually permitted in most major stock markets 
since short sellers may add liquidity to the market and can contribute to price discovery.  A large body 
of academic literature summarised below confirms that, on average, the presence of short sellers is 
beneficial for liquidity and price formation.   
Amid the turmoil in financial markets as the banking crisis of 2008 intensified, however, the U.K.’s 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) took the step of banning short sales of the equities of a number of 
financial institutions.  New provisions to the Code of Market Conduct were announced on Thursday 
18th September 2008 effective 00:01am the following day.  The provisions prohibited the creation or 
increase of net short positions, naked or covered, in publicly quoted financial companies and required 
daily disclosure (from 23rd September) of all net short positions in excess of 0.25 per cent of the 
ordinary share capital of the relevant companies, together with disclosure of net short positions held at 
close on 19th September.  The ban included intraday trading and had a global reach such that shorting 
of U.K. financial shares outside of the U.K. was also banned. The ban extended to cover shorting 
through derivatives, contracts for differences and spread betting, but since only ordinary and 
preference shares were covered by the ban short positions in bonds and credit derivatives were still 
possible.  Market makers were exempt.  The announcement specified that the provisions would 
remain in force until 16th January 2009 but that they would be reviewed after 30 days.  Both naked 
and covered short selling were banned under the provisions.   
 
                                                          
1
 The seller might have arranged to borrow the security from a third party for delivery to the buyer at settlement 
(a covered short) or may simply promise to deliver (a naked short).   
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Stocks in 32 financial firms were covered by the FSA’s ban at the time of announcement.2  The FSA 
defined financial companies as banks, insurers or the parent companies of banks or insurers.  This 
meant that stocks of U.K. listed fund managers, brokers and the London Stock Exchange itself were 
not subject to the ban.  Regulators around the world introduced similar restrictions at similar times, 
although the coverage and specifics of the restrictions on short selling differed across jurisdictions.   
The motivation for the new provisions banning short selling was clarified in a speech by Sir Callum 
McCarthy, Chairman of the FSA, on the evening of 18th September 2008.3   
“We have been much concerned – as have many – at the volatility and what I would describe 
as incoherence in the trading of equities, particularly for financial institutions.  There is a 
danger in a trading system which allows financial institutions to be targeted and subject to 
extreme short selling pressures, because movements in equity prices can be translated into 
uncertainty in the minds of those who place deposits with those institutions with consequent 
financial stability issues.  We have seen acute examples of this phenomenon in both London 
and New York this week.” 
His speech echoed the statement of his Chief Executive, Hector Sants, who earlier in the day said: 
“While we still regard short selling as a legitimate investment technique in normal market conditions, 
the current extreme circumstances have given rise to disorderly markets.” 
The statements from senior executives at the FSA make it clear that the ban on short sellers was in 
response to exceptional market eventss observed in the market place.  Thus, to the extent that they 
were aware of it, regulators ignored existing academic research on short-selling in stable market 
conditions, almost all of which suggests that short-sellers have positive effects on market quality. As 
the regulatory response was predicated on short-sellers performing very different roles in stable versus 
turbulent markets, it seems worthwhile to analyse the quality of UK equity markets in Autumn 2009 
and to evaluate the effects short-sellers might have had in those volatile marketstimes. This study 
seeks to do exactly that. We study how banning short sellers from operating in UK equity market in 
                                                          
2
 Some stocks were added to the list after the initial announcement and some companies were taken over during 
the period of the ban, unfortunately, too few to analyse separately.  
3
 Speech by Sir Callum McCarthy at the City Banquet, The Mansion House, London.  
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Autumn 2009 changed market quality (defined below). Certain oOther studies seek to do similar work 
on US and other markets and t. These are surveyed in section 2. 
The main innovation in our study is in the quality of the microstructural data we analyse.4  We have 
access to full order level data and signed transaction information on all stocks traded on the London 
Stock Exchange.  From the order book data we can compute separate measures of buy and sell 
liquidity and as the trade data signs every execution precisely, we can measure buy and sell volume, 
and thus net order flow.  This allows us to go far beyond the study of prices, bid-ask spreads and 
volumes contained in prior work on emergency short sales bans (e.g. Beber and Pagano, 2009; 
Boehmer, Jones and Zhang, 2009; Harris, Namvar and Phillips, 2009). For example, we can study 
whether financial stocks were subject to sustained and unusual selling pressure relative to other 
stocks. Further, given that the FSA’s policy intervention was explicitly designed to be asymmetric in 
its effects on traders, targeting short sellers but not long sellers or buyers, one might conjecture that it 
would affect trading and/or liquidity on the buy and sell sides of the market differently. Such 
asymmetries can only be detected using data such as that we employ.   
We focus on the following features measures of UK market quality around the time of the short sales 
ban: 
 Trading activity: we measure volumes and, more interestingly, order flows (i.e. net aggressive 
buying pressure) in financial stocks versus non-financials. 
 Liquidity: we examine spreads and measures related to the depth of the limit order book. We 
can analyse buy and sell side depth separately and thus evaluate whether the ban on short-
sales had an asymmetric effect on liquidity. 
 Efficiency: via the techniques introduced by Hasbrouck (1991) we calculate the proportion of 
variation in returns that is driven by information, as opposed to noise.  This has been used as a 
measure of market efficiency by, for example, Hendershott and Moulton (2009) in preference 
                                                          
4
 Clifton and Michayluk (2010) examine the U.K.’s ban using similar data to ours.  Their paper confirms several 
key order book developments that we note but it does not analyse the justification of the FSA’s move by 
considering developments in the pre-ban period.  Further, it does not discuss the evolution of market efficien cy 
and focuses instead on liquidity. 
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to more crude and far less informative precise measures such as the autocorrelation in 
returns.  
 Price discovery: we evaluate the contribution of trades to the determination of the efficient 
market price, again using the Hasbrouck (1991) technology. 
We use these data measures to address two main issues: Can we identify the “disorderly” conditions 
that prevailed in the period prior to the ban’s introduction, and did the change in rules on short sales 
do anything to remedy the “incoherence” of stock markets at the time?   
The answer to both of the questions above is “no”.  We struggle to identify any factors that would 
justify regulatory intervention specifically to support financial sector stocks.  While prices were 
falling and there was strong negative order flow (i.e. selling pressure) before the ban, this was true for 
both financial and matched non-financial stocks.  Further, efficiency and the role of trading in price 
discovery declined pre-ban by roughly the same amount for financials and non-financials.  It is 
therefore not clear to us why the FSA felt it needed to intervene specifically to change the nature of 
trading in the equities of financial sector stocks.  Any disorderly conditions appear to have been 
market-wide and not concentrated in the financial sectors. 
While we find few differences between the behaviour of financials and non-financials before the ban, 
once the ban was enacted differences become very apparent:  liquidity draineds from the order book 
for financials to a much larger extent than for non-financials; transactions costs for small and large 
trades increased much more dramatically and trading volumes feall much more dramatically for 
financials than non-financials.5 Finally, during the ban, efficiency and the information content of 
trading deteriorated much more for financials than non-financials.  None of these moves would appear 
to be in line with the objectives of regulators.   
                                                          
5
 Research based on bid ask spreads at the top of the order book tell a limited albeit consistent story.  Spreads for 
control group stocks during the ban were 79% higher than during the pre-crisis period while spreads for 
financials rose by 173%.  The cost of executing a market sell order for 0.25% of the average daily volume of 
control group stocks rose by 137% while the cost for financial stocks jumped by over 600%.  While spreads 
suggest that liquidity was generally lower during the ban and especially so for financials, our calculations of the 
costs of trading realistic numbers of shares show just how little liquidity was present for financial stocks during 
the ban. 
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Furthermore, we find no evidence that restrictions on one set of participants – short sellers – had 
asymmetric effects on the market.  Liquidity drained more-or-less equally from both the bid and offer-
sides of the order book, and while volume fell, aggressive sells and aggressive buys fell by similar 
amounts, leaving order flow unchanged (and thus still negative).  If by removing short sellers the FSA 
had hoped to make buying financial stocks cheaper or more attractive their move failed.  Trading in 
financial stocks, whether to buy or to sell, became much more expensive and less attractive. Finally, 
we also show that the ban resulted in a shift of trading off the limit order book towards darker bilateral 
trading between dealers. Again, it is unlikely that the FSA wished to shift the supply of liquidity 
towards less transparent segments of the market as this would likely contribute to the reduced 
efficiency and slower rates of price discovery that was observed for financials. 
The continued bans on short selling in some jurisdictions, the 2011 re-introduction of restrictions on 
short selling in France, Spain, Italy and Belgium and published comments by regulators suggest that 
some policy-makers still think that such changes to trading rules can improve the quality of trading in 
equities and enhance financial stability.  Our microstructure analysis of the market for U.K. financial 
stocks around the 2008/09 ban on short selling gives little support for such views. We confirm the 
evidence from the U.S. which indicates that trading volumes were decimated and bid-ask spreads 
greatly increased for financials. We go on to provide novel evidence that the ban did nothing to affect 
order flows in banned stocks, that depth drained symmetrically from the buy and sell sides of the 
markets for financials and that both market efficiency and the role of trading in price discovery were 
greatly reduced for financial stocks. Our results suggest that the positive contribution of short sellers 
to market quality in normal times found in the previous literature did not turn negative during the 
crisis. 
One additional benefit of our study is that we can take advantage of the relatively long-lived FSA ban 
on short selling.  Studies of the effect of the SEC’s short sales ban are complicated by its very short 
duration and the multitude of other policy initiatives and news that were emerging at the same time. 
For example the announcement and introduction of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) were 
contemporaneous with the introduction and removal of the US ban respectively.  We show that the 
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detrimental effects on liquidity and market quality were stable and held perssitentlyheld fairly 
consistently throughout the relatively long-lasting U.K. ban on short selling, but largely disappeared 
once it was lifted.  The major events seen in the weeks around the introduction of the short selling ban 
might be expected to have relatively long-lived effects on liquidity and efficiency.  However the 
deteriorations we note were both persistent and stable.  There is no evidence of gradual improvement 
in liquidity or efficiency through the months of the U.K. ban as would be expected as the effects of 
major shocks die away.  Most tellingly, tThe sharp subsequent improvements in liquidity and 
efficiency coinciding with lifting of the ban strongly suggest that the FSA’s ban on short selling was 
to blame rather than other market developments.   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 contains a summary of the key theoretical and 
empirical findings from the short selling literature.  Section 3 details the data used in the analysis.  
Section 4 presents our empirical results and the paper closes with conclusions in Section 5. 
 
2. A Brief Review of the Literature on Short Selling and Hypothesis Development 
There is a large literature suggesting that short selling enhances market efficiency and price discovery 
beginning with Miller (1977) and Harrison and Kreps (1978).  In Miller’s work, short-sales 
constraints exclude pessimistic investors and result in an upward bias to stock prices.  Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1987) extend this work to aa rational expectations setting in which negative information 
is fully incorporated into prices, framework in which the presence of options markets (or other related 
markets) allows pessimistic investors to establish appropriate positions.  These positions allow 
negative information to be incorporated into stock prices, moving them towards ‘fair value’ but 
possibly at a slower pace than when shorting is allowed.   
On the empirical front, Geczy, Musto and Reid (2002), Ofek and Richardson (2003) and Reed (2007), 
among many others, suggest that stock prices do not fully incorporate information in the presence of 
short sales constraints.  Bris, Goetzmann and Zhu (2007) compare equity markets around the world 
and demonstrate that negative information is incorporated into prices faster in markets where short 
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sales are allowed, and. Daouk and Chaoenrook (2005) analyse changes in short-selling restrictions in 
111 countries and conclude show that allowing short selling improves market quality, based on an 
analysis of changes in short selling restrictions in 111 countries.  . 
Boehmer, Jones and Zhang (2008) analyse individual short selling trades using proprietary NYSE 
data and show that short sellers are, on average, better informed than others traders and thus 
contribute to efficient pricing.  Fotak, Raman and Yadav (2009) concentrate on naked short sellers 
and also conclude that their impact is, on average, positive sinceshow that they naked short sellers 
function as liquidity providers and value arbitrageurs.  Similarly, Diether, Lee and Werner (2009) 
argue that short sellers both predict future stock performance (in that heavily shorted firms have 
negative future returns) and can recognise and correct transient market overreactions.  Many other 
papers suggest that, on average, the presence of short sellers increases market efficiency (see, for 
example, Saffi and Sigurdsson, 2011). 
However, the FSA’s ban on short selling and similar moves in other jurisdictionsthe SEC’s separate 
moves on naked and covered short selling were not justified on the basis of the average effect of the 
presence of short sellers.  Indeed the FSA made it clear that they believed that short sellers provide 
valuable services in normal times.  Rather, their actions were motivated by supposed predatory 
actions of short sellers in destabilised markets.  Shkilko, Van Ness and Van Ness (2009) argue that 
short selling may cause excessive price pressure.  They analyse days during which prices fall 
substantially and then quickly rebound and show that short selling at the beginning of the day is often 
aggressive and has a causal effect on the magnitude of declines, consistent with Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen’s (2005) model of predatory trading.  Focusing on U.S. financial stocks during the 2008 
crisis, however, Fotak, Raman and Yadav (2009) find no evidence that that the sharpest price declines 
were caused by naked short selling. 
Harris, Namvar and Phillips (2009) evaluate the effects of the SEC’s ban on the price level of US 
stocks and on the wealth transfer that resulted.  Using a factor-analytic model they conclude that the 
ban inflated financial sector stock values by 10-12% on average and that the subsequent reversal after 
the ban was lifted suggests the ban contributed to the temporary exclusion of negative value opinions 
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from the market.  Based on analysis at a higher sampling frequency, Boehmer, Jones and Zhang 
(2009) contest this conclusion.  They argue that the sharp price increase in stocks subject to the ban 
was probably due to the effect of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) announced alongside the 
short sales ban.  They also study some measures of liquidity (i.e. spreads and volume), showing that 
both deteriorated severely during the ban.  Beber and Pagano (2009) consider the impacts of short 
selling restrictions globally, exploiting the differential timing and coverage of restrictions in different 
jurisdictions.  They use end of day data to show that the restrictions were detrimental to liquidity and 
failed to lift stock prices (with the possible exception of financial stocks in the United States as 
analysed by Boehmer et al.).6 
Testable hypothesesIn the context of restrictions on short selling, considering liquidity on both sides 
of the order book separately also gives insight.  At one extreme, in a Miller-type world, if short sellers 
simply supply liquidity by adding limit orders to the offer side of the book, their exclusion during the 
ban will reduce offer-side liquidity and so raise the cost of buying stocks, leaving the cost of selling 
stocks unaltered.  However, the models of Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) and Bai, Chang and Wang 
(2006) suggest that a ban on short selling would reduce the speed of price discovery, making market 
prices less informative.  This increases the risk to an uninformed participant which might be expected 
to result in decreased liquidity provision on both sides of the book.   
The FSA’s comments quoted above suggest, however, that short sellers were not acting as simple 
suppliers of liquidity in the run-up to the ban, and we might instead characterise them as actively 
consuming bid side liquidity through aggressive orders to sell.  In this case, their exclusion will, other 
things kept equal, leave the supply of liquidity on the bid side higher than it would have otherwise 
been, and so keep the cost of selling low.7   
There is no theoretical literature on the issue of limit order book liquidity provision under short sales 
constraints, to our knowledge, and only limited empirical evidence.  Reed (2007) reports an 
                                                          
6
 Other papers examining the U.S. ban include Autore, Billingsley and Kovacs (2010) and Bailey and Zheng 
(2010).  Gagnon and Witmer (2010) study the effect of the ban on Canadian cross -listed stocks, while Helmes, 
Henker and Henker (2009) consider the ban on Australian stocks.  Bris (2008) examines the earl ier U.S. ban on 
naked short selling.   
7
 Again, the other side of the book might be expected to react to such developments, also reducing the cost of 
buying.   
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asymmetric price adjustment in response to information about earnings, and Bris et al. (2007) show 
that downward price moves are slower in markets where shorting is prohibited.  Both papers are 
consistent with the Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) rational expectations model in which prices react 
more slowly to negative information, and suggestive of relatively higher liquidity on the bid side of 
the book.  However, these results come from relatively normal times rather than crisis episodes and so 
below we let our data speak.  
 
Based on this summary of the literature and our interpretation of the statements made by senior 
executives of the FSA, we address the following hypotheses in the remainder of the paper. 
Hypothesis 1: 
Market quality deteriorated for financial stocks to a greater extent than it did for non-financial stocks 
immediately prior to the start of the ban on short selling. 
This hypothesis is based on the FSA’s characterisation of markets as being “disorderly”. ThisWe look 
for evidence of  deterioration in market quality would be evidenced bythrough (i) an increase in 
trading costs for seller-initiated orders, (ii) increasingly negative net order flow, both due to the 
liquidity-consuming actions of predatory short-sellers, (iii) a deterioration in the signal to noise ratio 
in the variance of returns and (iv) a decrease in the contribution of trades to the determination of 
efficient prices, due to the non-information-based trades of manipulative short-sellers. 
However, in the ban period itself, one might formulate two sets of competing hypotheses, which 
essentially pit the view an interpretation of the likely regulatory view against a view based on 
academic analysis of short-selling and its effect on markets. 
Hypothesis 2: 
Based on our interpretation of the intentions of the FSA (and consistent, at least in part, with the 
Miller-type view of the world), a ban on short-sales should lead towe observe a reversal of the effects 
set out under Hypothesis 1.   
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Hypothesis 3: 
Based on the Diamond and Verrecchia/consensus academic view of short-sellers as passive suppliers 
of liquidityagents who contribute both information and liquidity to markets, the short-sales ban 
should worsen market quality worsened significantly for financials relative to non-financials during 
the ban.   
Under this view of the world, Thus we would expect to would observe decreased liquidity provision 
on both sides of the order book, an increase in the signal to noise ratio in returns variance (i.e. lower 
efficiency) and a lower contribution of trades to efficient pricing. 
 
Under both hypotheses 2 and 3 we would likely expect trading activity to decrease. 
 
3. Data 
Our analysis is based on data sourced from the London Stock Exchange (LSE) that allows us to 
recreate the full limit order book entry by entry from start June 2008 through end February 2009 for 
stocks traded on the main market of the LSE.  Specifically we analyse all stocks traded on either the 
SETS or SETSmm systems (the ‘main market’).  23 of the 32 stocks subject to the FSA ban on short 
selling were traded on the LSE’s main market these systems and are analysed below.  We have 
dropped two financial stocks also traded on the main market because of incomplete data during our 
sample due to mergers. The remaining seven stocks were traded on the Alternative Investment Market 
and are not part of our sample.   
We reconstruct the limit order books in continuous time for the 313 LSE stocks that were 
continuously traded throughout our sample data period without major corporate actions.  We take 
snapshots of these order books at one-minute intervals and, record the key features and from these 
build daily time-weighted averages.  These features of the trading book are then aggregated into daily 
time-weighted averages.  We also calculate other features such as daily trading volume which 
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incorporates transactions both on and off the order book.  We are interested in the following 
indicators: 
Liquidity and Costs of Trading 
Our key measures of liquidity are bid-ask spreads and slippage measures derived from the shape of 
the limit order book. We define buy (sell) slippage to be the difference between the current midquote 
and the volume weighted average price of a market buy (sell) of given size. Thus slippage is inversely 
related to order book depth. Slippage measures are defined for various notional market order sizes.  
 
Transactions 
We measure all transactions-related variables in terms of the numbers of shares traded rather than by 
value to avoid the effect of price level changes during the sample. Volume is computed as the sum of 
shares bought and sold in a day.8 As the LSE data provides information on whether trades are buyer or 
seller initiated we can also measure buy and sell volume separately. From here, wWe compute order 
flow as buyer initiated volume less seller initiated volume, scaled by total volume. For the three 
volume measures, we scale the daily measures by the mean value in the first 25 days of the sample. 
Finally, we also compute, for each day in the sample, the proportion of each day’s LSE volume traded 
on the order book, rather than traded off order book in the bilateral segment of the market.9 
Returns 
Daily returns for banned and matched stocks, are also computed and are measured in basis points. 
Matching  
In the regressions below we match each stock subject to the ban with ten stocks that do not fall under 
the ban (the control group stocks) according to market capitalisation.  Specifically, we compute the 
average market capitalisation of each stock on the LSE over the first half of 2008.  For each stock 
                                                          
8
 We measure all transactions-related variables in terms of the numbers of shares traded rather than by value to 
avoid the effect of price level changes during the sample.  
9
 We do not have data for trades on other venues such as Chi-X and BATS or on trades reported to Boat. 
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subject to the ban we find ten stocks with the most similar average market caps.10  The control group 
for each stock is then unaltered for the rest of the sample.   The equally weighted average value of 
each indicator across these ten stocks is then used as a benchmark against which we compare the 
indicator for the banned stock.  Table 1 details the 23 companies subject to the ban together with 
market cap information for them and their control group counterparts.  The variation in market 
capitalisation across these stocks is apparent.  While the average market capitalisation of the matching 
stocks is relatively close for the smaller stocks, the largest two companies are more difficult to match 
with a simple average control group.11   
In the analysis below we report results based on the full set of 23 companies.  In results available in 
the Internet Appendix we report separate results for the six largest stocks – the international 
commercial banks in the sample – and for the remaining 17 smaller stocks that are either investment 
banks, insurance companies or asset managers.12 There are no great differences between behaviour of 
the ‘Big 6’ or the ‘Small 17’, but splitting them sometimes helps statistical inference by reducing 
cross-sectional heterogeneity. 
<   Table 1  >  
<   Descriptive stats of banned and matched samples  >  
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Difference-in-Difference Regressions 
                                                          
10
 Note that stocks can be in the control group for more than one firm subject to the ban.  
11
 We have experimented with improving the match by using a smaller number of stocks in the control group or 
weighted average matching, and our results are robust to these alternatives.  For our regression analysis below, 
we identify and exclude any dramatic outliers in the entire set of matched non-banned stocks. On each sample 
day, we eliminate data for any matched stock which is more than 10 standard deviations away from that day’s 
cross-sectional mean. This ensures that no extreme data in the sample of matched stocks affect our results.  
12
 The six large stocks that we analyse separately are HSBC, RBS, Lloyds, Barclays, HBOS and Standard 
Chartered. 
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We use a difference-in-difference regression to model the behaviour of the various indicators through 
our sample.  This empirical approach is designed to measure the effect of a ‘treatment’ on a set of 
subjects through comparison of the behaviour of the treated group and a control sample pre and post 
treatment. It has been used extensively in studies of regulatory change in economics, law and 
finance.13 Denote by yi,t our variable of interest.  For each of the N financial stocks subject to the ban 
we have T observations on yi,t and T observations for the matched sample.  The dependent variable 
then is a matrix with T rows and 2N columns. 
The difference in difference regression is nothing other than a panel regression augmented with sets of 
dummy variables.. The right-hand side specification contains a constant (α) and a dummy variable to 
select observations for the financial stocks subject to the ban (DF). We add dummies to pick out 
observations during the ten trading days immediately prior to the introduction of the ban ( DPre), a 
dummy to pick out observations during the ban (DBan) and a dummy to pick out observations after the 
ban was removed (DPost). The difference in difference terms which isolate the difference in behaviour 
of the control stocks and the banned stocks are nothing other than interactions of the three time 
dummies with the dummy that selects banned stocks (i.e. interactions of DF with DPre, DBan and DPost 
respectively). If the coefficients on these interactions are significantly different from zero it reveals a 
difference in the behaviour of banned and control group stocks for a particular period. 
 
Finally, we add a volatility control variable to the right hand side, constructed as the equally weighted 
average daily volatility of all the stocks in our sample except the financial stocks (Vt). This controls 
for market wide changes in the information environment and Beber and Pagano (2009) use a similar 
control in their study of the effects of short-sales bans on spreads.14 One could use previous work to 
add further control variables to the specification. For example, the typical time-series models for 
liquidity measures also control for traded volume and market cap. However, in the current context, the 
                                                          
13
 See Ashenfelter and Card (1985), Angrist and Pischke (2009) and Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) 
for examples and explanations of the difference-in-difference approach. 
14
 We omit the volatility control variable when running our specification with returns as the dependent variable. 
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first of these is clearly endogenous and market cap differences between banned and control stocks 
have been controlled for via our matching process.. 
 
The full regression specification is given below. Robust, double-clustered standard errors are reported 
which, as Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) point out, tend to be rather conservative.   
 
฀฀,฀ = ฀+฀ଵ฀฀,฀฀ +฀ଶ฀฀,฀฀฀฀ +฀ଷ฀฀,฀฀ ×฀฀,฀฀฀฀ +฀ସ฀฀,฀฀฀฀ +฀ହ฀฀,฀฀ ×฀฀,฀฀฀฀+฀଺฀฀,฀฀฀฀฀+฀଻฀฀,฀฀ ×฀฀,฀฀฀฀฀ +฀଼฀฀ +฀฀,฀ 
           (1) 
4.1.1 Headline Figures 
Since the novelty in our work is in the detail of the microstructure data that we have, the main focus 
of our work is on characteristics derived from consideration of the full trading environment.  
However, we begin with a brief discussion of variables previously addressed in the literature. 
<   Table 2 >  
<  returns, spreads, volatility and volume >  
Table 2 reports the results of our difference-in-difference analysis using returns, spreads, volatility 
and volume as dependent variables for the full set of 23 affected stocks plus matched control stocks.   
While we do not expect our difference-in-difference approach to explain the behaviour of equity 
returns over this extraordinary period we can make some observations.  Returns were (statistically 
insignificantly) negative over the benchmark period (2nd June 2008 – 4th September 2008), and the 
immediate pre-ban period saw a significant deterioration in prices for all stocks.  Furthermore, returns 
were significantly worse for financials than control group stocks.15  Clearly, these especially rapid 
falls in the stock prices of large financial institutions were would have likely been key factors behind 
the FSA’s move to restrict short selling.  There is no evidence of return differentials between 
financials and control group stocks after the ban came into effect or once the ban was lifted.  This is in 
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 This result is mainly driven by the Big-6 financial stocks rather than the smaller banned companies. 
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contrast to the evidence for the United States in Harris et al. (2009) but lends credence to the 
suggestion in Boehmer et al. (2009) that the jump in stock prices of U.S. financials was driven by 
TARP-related announcements rather than the simultaneous ban on short sales.16  Taken as a whole, 
oOur evidence suggests that U.K. financials significantly under-performed control group stocks pre-
ban, but that this performance differential disappeared during and after the ban. Thus, overall, If if the 
goal of the FSA was to arrest sharp declines in financials’ stock prices relative to those of non-
financials, our results may be interpreted as reflecting success for their policy of banning short sales.  
However, as the Introduction makes clear, the FSA’s stated goal was not to prop up the prices of 
financial stocks but to calm ‘disorderly markets’. 
The literature has also established that volatility, volume and spreads all changed dramatically around 
the ban period, and our findings confirm these results.  In the baseline period, spreads on the control 
stocks averaged 19.34bp, while with spreads on financials were insignificantly narrowersmaller.  In 
the immediate pre-ban period spreads in all stocks widened by around 3bp.  During the ban period, 
spreads rose by 15bp from baseline levels for the control group to 35bp for the control group, while 
those spreads for financial stocks jumped to 52bp.  Spreads fell slightly for the control group once the 
ban was lifted, but the additional 17bp spread charged on banned stocks disappeared.   
Trading volume shows perhaps the most dramatic behaviour.  Volume during the benchmark period 
for all stocks was slightly down on the level seen during the first 25 days of the sample (used to 
normalise volume measures).  It increased significantly in the immediate pre-ban period by 36% for 
control stocks, and while the point estimate for financial stocks is even higher this difference is not 
significant.  Volume in the ban period for control stocks was still 17% higher than benchmark levels 
despite the wider spreads.  Given the extremely high levels of stock return volatility at this time, for 
this group of stocks the usual positive relationship between volume and volatility is observed.  
However, trading volume in financial stocks during the ban was substantially lower, down by 23% 
from the benchmark period’s level, and 40% lower than volume in control stocks in the same period.  
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announcements rather than the simultaneous ban on short sales.  Beber and Pagano (2009) also report an 
absence of stock price jumps for the U.K. as part of their global study on short sales restrictions. 
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This is despite the fact, reported in the Internet Appendix, that volatility for financials was much 
higher than usual.  Once the ban was lifted, control group volumes returned to benchmark levels (as 
volatility fell), while volumes in financials recovered. This negative correlation between volatility and 
volume is, again, unusual.   
These findings, consistent with other studies, tell a simple story.  The high levels of volatility and 
trading volume immediately before and during the ban for the control stocks suggest that this was a 
period of relatively high information revelation.  Spreads widened throughout the period as liquidity 
suppliers acted less aggressively.  Financial stocks were still at the heart of the crisis and so it is 
unreasonable to suggest that information revelation was low for them.  They too saw an increase in 
volatility and trading costs.  Trading volume for financials fell by 40% relative to the control group 
during the period the ban on short selling was effective, more for larger financial stocks. The short 
sales ban therefore raised the cost of trading at a time when more people wanted to trade and when the 
cost of trading was already relatively high. 
 
4.1.2 Transactions and Transparency 
The patterns in volumes outlined above suggest that the ban on short selling had a huge impact on the 
trading in financial stocks.  Trade volumes deteriorated dramatically, while volume in the control 
stocks remained above benchmark levels.  While the exact rationale behind the introduction of the ban 
has not been made public, simply reducing trading volume was probably not the aim of the ban on 
short selling.  Rather, it seems more reasonable to assume that the FSA wanted to reduce selling 
pressure on financial stocks.  In other words, one goal of the ban might have been to increase order 
flow in financials by raising the amount of market buy orders relative to market sells.   
We examine this by looking at order flow on the LSE book. As Table 2 shows, flow was negative for 
all stocks in the baseline period, consistent with a falling stock market, and flow for financial stocks 
was significantly worse.  In the pre-ban period, flow deteriorated significantly for all stocks.  
Importantly, however, flow for financial stocks behaved no differently to flow for the control group 
during this pre-ban period, making it hard to justify intervention by the authorities designed 
specifically to affect financials only, a point we return to in Section 4.2 below. 
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<   Figure 2  >  
<    Flow plot  >  
 
Figure 2Figure 1 illustrates the behaviour of cumulated flows averaged across financials and control 
group stocks.  Both show clear negative trends and while financial stocks suffer more, most of this is 
due to very high selling pressure well before the ban.  Both series move very much in line during the 
pre-ban period [-20, 0], and the trends extend through the ban period.  Clearly, the selling pressure on 
financial stocks during the ban could only be from aggressive long- sales.17  The ban on short selling 
did not reverse the direction of trade flow, which on average remained out of financial stocks 
immediately before and during the ban.18   
While the majority of transactions in our sample stocks take place on the LSE order book, dealers 
could and still can transact with each other and directly with customers off book.  Communicating 
directly with a dealer allows a trader to negotiate over price, particularly if the dealer can be 
convinced the trader is uninformed, and to collect market intelligence.  Prior research suggests that, 
faced with increased uncertainty and poor order book liquidity, impatient traders might be induced to 
seek liquidity off-book (Friederich and Payne, 2007).   
Table 2 shows that in the benchmark period, on average, 76% of transactions reported to the LSE took 
place on the order book for both financials and control group stocks.  This rose by around 2% in the 
two weeks prior to the ban for all companies, large or small, financial sector or control group.  During 
the ban, however, while control group trading was unaltered, order book trading in financial stocks 
was 7-8% below benchmark levels.  The response of traders to the sizeable withdrawal of liquidity on 
the order book for financials during the short sales ban was to transact instead with market makers. 
Thus, during the ban, almost 10% of trading activity in financial stocks migrated to a less transparent, 
in a pre-trade sense, segment of the market. The likely effect of such a migration is a smaller 
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 These sales could also have been due to market-maker activities but over a relatively long period one would 
expect marker maker flows to be balanced. 
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 Arguably, the figure suggests that selling pressures on financials grew stronger immediately after the ban was 
announced before slowing some 20 days after the ban was introduced.  Nevertheless, the big picture remains 
that the ban did little to alter selling pressure on financial stocks over the period.  
19 
 
contribution to price discovery from the order book and reduced efficiency in order book prices. The 
next sSection 4.2 provides some direct evidence to support this assertion. 
The results in this section confirm the perhaps surprisingly symmetric effect that the ban had on 
trading in financial stocks.  The ban explicitly removed one class of trade – short sales – and the 
inference from Sir Callum’s comments quoted above is that the specific target was short sellers that 
were aggressively consuming liquidity on the bid side of the book.  As such we might have expected 
to see a reduction in the number of aggressive sales relative to the number of aggressive buys.  We do 
not.  While the number of sell orders dramatically fell, the number of buy orders fell similarly, leaving 
the balance of order flow unaffected.  We noted in section 4.1.2 that the drop in liquidity was also 
approximately equal on the bid and offer sides of the order book.  Together, these findings suggest 
that the short sellers excluded by the ban were not aggressive consumers of liquidity from the bid side 
but were instead suppliers of liquidity, at least to the offer side of the book.  As offer-side liquidity 
was removed by the ban, bid-side liquidity either fell directly, perhaps as market-neutral funds were 
forced to withdraw from both sides of the book, or indirectly as liquidity suppliers on the bid side 
reacted to the liquidity drain on the opposite side of the book. 
 
 
4.1.3 Costs of Trading and Depth 
Bid-ask spreads are an easy to measure indicator of liquidity, however, they are only completely 
relevant for extremely small deals.  Further, existing studies of short-sales bans that measure the bid-
ask spread using data from the end of the trading day risk contamination by time of day effects on 
spreads.  Analysis of the full order book sampled at a high frequency can give a richer view of 
liquidity by revealing depths available for trade at all price levels throughout the day, rather than 
focusing on just the prices at the top of the book at one point in time.   
In the context of restrictions on short selling, considering liquidity on both sides of the order book 
separately also gives insight.  At one extreme, in a Miller-type world, if short sellers simply supply 
liquidity by adding limit orders to the offer side of the book, their exclusion during the ban will reduce 
offer-side liquidity and so raise the cost of buying stocks, leaving the cost of selling stocks unaltered.  
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However, the models of Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) and Bai, Chang and Wang (2006) suggest 
that a ban on short selling would reduce the speed of price discovery, making market prices less 
informative.  This increases the risk to an uninformed participant which might be expected to result in 
decreased liquidity provision on both sides of the book.   
The FSA’s comments quoted above suggest, however, that short sellers were not acting as simple 
suppliers of liquidity in the run-up to the ban, and we might instead characterise them as actively 
consuming bid side liquidity through aggressive orders to sell.  In this case, their exclusion will, other 
things kept equal, leave the supply of liquidity on the bid side higher than it would have otherwise 
been, and so keep the cost of selling low.19   
There is no theoretical literature on the issue of limit order book liquidity provision under short sales 
constraints, to our knowledge, and only limited empirical evidence.  Reed (2007) reports an 
asymmetric price adjustment in response to information about earnings, and Bris et al. (2007) show 
that downward price moves are slower in markets where shorting is prohibited.  Both papers are 
consistent with the Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) rational expectations model in which prices react 
more slowly to negative information, and suggestive of relatively higher liquidity on the bid side of 
the book.  However, these results come from relatively normal times rather than crisis episodes and so 
we let our data speak.  
<   Figure 1  >  
<   order book plot  >  
 
The final panel of Table 2 gives our difference-in-difference results for our order book slippage 
measures. It is immediately clear that the ban greatly degraded depth for financial stocks relative to 
stocks in other industries and that this effect disappeared once the ban was lifted. This result is 
perhaps easier to see in Figure 1Figure 2 which plots the average shape of the order book for financial 
and control group stocks during the benchmark and ban periods.  The figure shows the cost of the 
marginal share in a trade of given size (and is thus different from our slippage measures which are the 
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volume weighted average price of a share in a trade.).  The book is slightly deeper (cheaper) for 
control group stocks than for financials during the benchmark period, but deteriorates during the ban, 
suggesting that general liquidity conditions were poor at this time.  However, the change in the book 
for financial stocks is much more dramatic.  The marginal share in a 0.5% of ADV market buy order, 
for example, cost over 1,000bp more than the mid price during the ban, up from around 100bp in the 
benchmark period.  Depth was massively reduced at all prices and on both sides of the book.  The 
deterioration is approximately symmetric at smaller depths (<0.003ADV), but the offer side of the 
book clearly suffers more at greater depths.  Neither the incredible fall in liquidity on both sides of the 
book, nor the somewhat higher costs of executing large buy orders for financials could have been in 
line with the wishes of the regulators when they introduced the short sales ban.    
The results in this section and the preceding one confirm the perhaps surprisingly symmetric effect 
that the ban had on trading in financial stocks.  The ban explicitly removed one class of trade – short 
sales – and the inference from Sir Callum’s comments quoted above is that the specific target was 
short sellers that were aggressively consuming liquidity on the bid side of the book.  As such we 
might have expected to see a reduction in the number of seller-initiated deals relative to the number of 
buyer-initiated ones, and an increase in liquidity available on the bid side.  Instead, we observe an 
equal fall in buyer- and seller-initiated deals, leaving net flow unchanged, and more-or-less equal 
drops in liquidity on both sides of the book. 
In terms of the alternative scenarios sketched out above, our results suggest that the short sellers were, 
on balance at least, passive suppliers of offer-side liquidity rather than aggressive consumers of bid-
side liquidity.  Their exclusion through the ban hugely raised the cost of executing buy orders.  The 
rational expectations class of models suggest that uninformed participants then ought to have 
perceived an increase in risk as market efficiency fell, leading to a reduction in bid-side liquidity at 
the same time.  This is exactly what we observe in the data.  The key step in this logic – that market 
efficiency was harmed by the ban – is considered in section 4.2 below. 
An alternative and perhaps simpler explanation for the simultaneous and equal drop in bid and offer-
side liquidity supply is that the primary impact of the ban on short selling was to force market-neutral 
equity hedge funds out of financial stocks.  These funds take long and short positions in different but 
22 
 
(statistically) related stocks, seeking to profit from short-term adjustments in relative prices.  Since 
their positions are often industry neutral, either by design or because the correlated stocks they are 
trading are likely to be in the same sector, once unable to take short positions in financials these funds 
were also much less likely to take long positions.  Their withdrawal from the financial sector therefore 
reduced liquidity on both sides of the book approximately equally.20 
 
4.2 Hasbrouck VAR Decompositions 
In this section we run standard Hasbrouck VARs on the sample of financial stocks and on the control 
group stocks and employ them to assess several dimensions of market quality, and the role played by 
trading activity in the determination of market quality around the short sales ban. Hendershott and 
Moulton (2009) use an identical technology to evaluate the effects of changes in the NYSE’s trading 
rules on market efficiency and price discovery. 
In Hasbrouck’s (1991) framework price changes may be driven by private information, which enters 
the market through unexpected trading activity, or public information. This is modelled 
econometrically with a bivariate VAR containing two variables: mid-quote returns between trades at 
time t and t-1 (denoted by r t and measured in basis points) and the signed trade at time t (denoted by qt 
and taking the value +1 if the trade at time t was a market buy and -1 for a market sell). The VAR 
picks up order flow dependence out to p lags: 
฀฀ = ∑ ฀฀฀฀−฀ +∑ ฀฀฀฀−฀ +฀฀฀฀
฀=଴
฀
฀=ଵ  
           (3) 
฀฀ = ∑ ฀฀฀฀−฀ +∑ ฀฀฀฀−฀ +฀฀฀฀
฀=ଵ
฀
฀=ଵ  
           (4) 
The standard VAR can be inverted to get the VMA representation: [฀฀฀฀] = [฀ሺ฀ሻ ฀ሺ฀ሻ฀ሺ฀ሻ ฀ሺ฀ሻ] [฀฀฀฀฀฀] 
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           (5) 
where a(L), b(L), c(L), and d(L) are lag polynomial operators, and 
฀฀฀ [฀฀฀฀฀฀] = (฀ଶ ͲͲ Ω) 
           (6) 
We can also define 
฀฀ଶ = (∑ ฀฀∞
฀=଴ )Ω(∑ ฀฀′∞฀=଴ ) + (ͳ + ∑ ฀฀∞฀=଴ )ଶ฀ଶ 
           (7) 
and 
฀฀ଶ = (∑ ฀฀∞
฀=଴ )Ω(∑ ฀฀′∞฀=଴ ) 
           (8) 
where (7) is the variance of the permanent component of returns and (8) is the variance of the trade-
related component of returns. A ten-lag VAR is estimated for each stock for the four separate intervals 
and from these VARs three measures are computed 
 
First, the price impact of a trade (PI) is measured by the sum of the b(L) coefficients in the VMA 
representation. This is equivalent to the impulse response of prices to a trade innovation implied by 
the VAR and is another liquidity measure. Second, we compute the size of the permanent component 
of prices (PC), measured by as the ratio of the variance of the permanent component of returns 
defined in (7) to total return variance is computed. This gives us another market quality measure, 
namelymeasures how important information is versus noise in driving returns and is thus a measure of 
informational efficiency.  The closer this number is to unity, the larger the information content. We 
interpret this as a measure of market efficiency as larger numbers suggest that returns are driven more 
by information production rather than noise. . Last we calculate the size of the trade correlated 
component (TCC), measured as the ratio of the variance of the trade-correlated component [defined in 
equation (8)] to the variance of the permanent component [defined in equation (7)]. This tells us how 
Formatted: Don't adjust space between Latin and Asian text,
Don't adjust space between Asian text and numbers
24 
 
what proportionmuch of information was getting into permanent price changes through trading and 
thus measures trading related price discovery.  
  A number closer to unity suggests that trading conveyed more information, whereas a low number 
would suggest that prices adjusted without the need for trading. 
<  Table 6 >  
<  Hasbrouck results for all, buys and sells >  
 
Table 6Table 3 reports the simple average of each measure across the financial stocks and the control 
group stocks in each period.  Two main points stand out from the table.  First, there is no 
economically meaningful difference between financial stocks and control group stocks for any of the 
three measures during the benchmark period.  Further, while the price impact of trades rose and 
market qualityefficiency and price discovery indicators deteriorated between benchmark and 
immediate pre-ban periods, financial and control group stocks were affected equally.  Though the 
difference is small, the deterioration in market efficiency (measured by PC) was, if anything, larger 
for the benchmark stocks than for financials.  This again questions the decision to single out financial 
sector stocks for special regulatory intervention. 
Second, and conversely, financial and control group stocks behaved noticeably very differently for all 
three measures while the ban was in effect.  The price impact of trades rose by 64% compared to the 
benchmark period for the control group stocks, but by more than one-hundred percent for financial 
stocks.  This again reflects the much larger drain in liquidity for financials caused by the ban on short 
selling.  The permanent component of prices fell by 30% for control stocks but by almost 46% for 
financials.  Put differently, the signal to noise ratio in the returns process dropped dramatically for 
financial stocks.  These figures suggest that there was a general fall in efficiency during the ban but 
that the fall was significantly larger for those stocks affected by the ban.  Finally, the trade correlated 
component of trades fell just 17% for control group stocks yet almost halved during the period of the 
ban for financials.  Trades conveyed much less information during the period of the ban for financials.  
This fall is perhaps partially due to the high level of public information revelation at this time, which 
may have been priced without the need for trading.  However, once the ban was lifted, the TCC for 
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financials returned to the same level seen prior to the ban (and to the level that prevailed for control 
group stocks throughout the sample).  Together with the huge drop in PC for financials, this suggests 
that the ban on short selling made order book prices less informative and impeded the role of the 
trading process in the discovery of efficient prices. These findings echo those of Fotak et al. (2009) 
who conclude that SEC ban on naked short selling of financial securities during July and August 2008 
had a negative impact on pricing efficiency for U.S. stocks.21 
In summary, this set of results suggests that while market quality declined somewhat in the run-up to 
the ban financial and control group stocks were moving very much in line with each other.  We noted 
above that selling pressure on stocks, while significantly stronger in the period just before the ban 
than in the benchmark period, was approximately equal for both financials and control group stocks.  
Together, these results lead us to question the decision to ‘support’ financial stocks with a ban on 
shorting.  Having done so, it is apparent that the ban only served to significantly worsen market 
quality for financial stocks. Trades conveyed much less information to the market during the ban and 
the drop in liquidity doubled the price impact of trades.  This could not have been in line with the 
goals of the FSA. 
 
4.3 Persistence of the effects of the ban 
Studies of the short selling ban in the U.S. have important shortcomings.  First, several other events 
occurred at much the same time as the ban was introduced.  On the day the U.S. short sales ban took 
effect, the U.S. Treasury announced the creation of what would become the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program.22  Further, the U.S. ban on short selling was lifted just three business days after the 
enactment of TARP.  The correlation in the timing of these events greatly complicates the 
interpretation of the US evidence on the short-sales ban. Both the short sales ban and TARP could 
have been interpreted by the markets as signals of the U.S. governments’ pessimistic views of the 
state of the (global) financial sector. If this is the case, the effects of these signals are difficult to 
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 Reed (2009) similarly concludes that stocks where short selling is costly (through standard demand and 
supply forces) are much less informationally efficient. 
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 The U.S. Treasury also announced a guarantee program for money market funds, and the Fed announced a 
program to lend against high-quality asset-backed commercial paper. 
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separate from the effect of restricted short selling, especially in the U.S. when the short sales ban was 
relatively short-lived and so well-aligned with developments in TARP.   
 
Fortunately, the longer period of the U.K. ban helps in this regard.  If the negative changes in liquidity 
at the beginning of the ban are due to the abovementioned government signals (rather than the ban 
itself), they should would likely recover through the ban period.  Conversely, if the deterioration in 
liquidity was due to the short sales ban, the deterioration should be apparent for the full period of the 
ban.  Further, since the end of the U.K. ban was free from confounding events, evidence of 
improvement in liquidity and trading volumes at this time strengthen the argument that the 
deteriorations can be ascribed to restrictions on short selling rather than other events. 
In this sub-section we introduce sub-period trend variables into our basic regression model to capture 
possible gradual adjustment processes. 
฀฀,฀ = ฀+฀ଵ฀฀,฀฀ +฀଴฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀ +฀ଵ฀฀,฀฀ ×฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀ + 
฀ଶ฀฀,฀฀฀฀ +฀ଷ฀฀,฀฀ ×฀฀,฀฀฀฀ +฀ଶ฀฀,฀฀฀฀ ×฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀ +฀ଷ฀฀,฀฀ ×฀฀,฀฀฀฀ ×฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀ + 
฀ସ฀฀,฀฀฀฀ +฀ହ฀฀,฀฀ ×฀฀,฀฀฀฀ +฀ସ฀฀,฀฀฀฀ ×฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀ +฀ହ฀฀,฀฀ ×฀฀,฀฀฀฀ ×฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀ + 
฀଺฀฀,฀฀฀฀฀+฀଻฀฀,฀฀ ×฀฀,฀฀฀฀฀ +฀଺฀฀,฀฀฀฀฀ ×฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀+฀଻฀฀,฀฀ ×฀฀,฀฀฀฀฀ ×฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀+฀଼฀฀ +฀฀,฀ 
            (2) 
This specification contains four trends, one each for the benchmark, pre, ban, and post periods and 
each trend variable is allowed to affect the banned and control group stocks differently.  Each trend is 
allowed to affect all firms equally during the relevant period and when interacted with the financial 
stock dummy captures trends specific toto affect just financial firms.  Significantly different trends for 
the financial firms subject to the ban would then be revealed by significant β1, β3, β5, or β7 
coefficients.  Results are reported in Table 5Table 4. 
< Table 5 > 
< regressions with trends > 
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TheOur most important finding here is that there is no evidence of trends during the ban period for the 
cost of trading indicators (spreads, BSlip2 and OSlip2).23  The significant rise in trading costs for 
benchmark firms and the much larger rise for financial firms appear to be constant rather than 
changing duringacross the long U.K. ban period.  Slippage costs were trending upwards immediately 
prior to the ban for all firms (and not significantly differently for financials).  Once the ban was 
removed, while slippage costs remained on average higher for control group stocks and particularly 
high for financials, they were trending downwards for control group stocks and were trending 
downwards significantly faster for financials.   
The results for transactions indicators suggest there were significant trends during the ban for all 
firms.  Volumes trended downwards significantly through the ban, but those in financial firms trended 
downwards at the same rate asat the same rate for banned and  control group stocks.  The markedly 
different levels effects for these variables discussed above remain significant, however, even when 
these trends are taken into account.  Finally, we note that order flow shows no evidence of either 
levels or trend effects at any time.. 
The results of the dynamic analysis are quite clear.  Transactions costs rose significantly more for 
financial stocks during the ban period, and these higher trading costs remained relatively stable 
throughout the ban.  Once the ban was lifted, transactions costs fell and continued to fall as the market 
adjusted to the new regimetrading conditions.  Volumes dropped dramatically for financials during 
the ban relative to control group stocks.  The evidence strongly suggests that the different behaviour 
of liquidity and trading indicators for financials was due to the ban on short selling rather than 
confounding effects. 
 
4.4 Robustness Checks 
We recognise that we have made some arbitrary choices in our empirical work, and that the 
robustness of our results might be a concern. We seek to allay those fears in this section, describing 
                                                          
23
 We report slippage costs only for 1/10th of ADV for parsimony.  Other trade sizes give qualitatively similar 
results. 
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some variations to the analysis that we have performed and their effect on our results. All are more 
fully described in the Internet Appendix to the paper. 
First, we do not know the pre-ban window during which the FSA observed what it described as 
disorderly trading conditions.  In the results above we have used a two-week window immediately 
prior to the introduction of the ban.  We have varied this two-week window in two ways. First we 
have looked at a one month pre-event window. Second, we have excluded the week immediately prior 
to the introduction of the ban and used the two weeks preceding that week (trading days [-15, -5]).  
Neither of these changes makes any material difference to our results.  
 
Second, we recognise that the first day for which the ban was effective (September 19th) saw large-
scale adjustments of portfolios to reflect the new rules and as such may be deemed an outlier 
observation.  We therefore exclude this day from our analysis to ensure that it does not bias our 
findings for the ban period.  Again, our results do not change in any important fashion. 
 
We also study whether any of these changes to the definitions of the pre-ban period or whether we 
include the day of the ban has any effect on the Hasbrouck-VAR analysis. Again, the answer is ‘no’. 
 
A final possible criticism that might be levelled at our VAR analysis is that it treats market buy and 
market sell orders symmetrically. It could be argued that the effects of sell orders in the run-up to the 
ban were particularly severe.  To test this, we have run an extended version of the VAR system with 
returns, trades and a set of interactions that separate market buys and sells on the right hand side.  The 
interactions suggest that the differences between buy and sell orders are, in general, economically 
minuscule and statistically insignificant.  In particular, the sum of the coefficients on sell trades in the 
returns equation is smaller than the sum of the buy coefficients, suggesting that, if anything, sells had 
Formatted: Justified, Space After:  6 pt, Adjust space
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a smaller impact on prices than buys.24 Given the tiny differences between coefficients on buys and 
sells, the simple specification reported in the paper seems entirely appropriate. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have compared examined several the microstructurale indicators of conditions 
prevailing inof U.K. stock markets between June 2008 and February 2009.  This period spans the 
introduction and subsequent removal of new provisions to the Code of Market Conduct issued by the 
Financial Services Authority that banned the creation or increase of net short positions in publicly 
quoted U.K. financial companies.  We have attempted to answer two key questions in this paper.   
First, was there any clear difference between the microstructural behaviour of financial stocks and set 
of control group stocks that might have motivated the FSA’s move to ban short-selling?  Since figures 
in the FSA spoke of “incoherence” in stock markets and stated that “disorderly” conditions prevailed 
in the period prior to the ban’s introduction we might have expected to find evidence of abnormal 
conditions in the market for financial company stocks in the period before 18th September 2008.   
Second, what were the effects of the ban on short selling on market conditions in general, and on 
liquidity, efficiency, trading activity and price discovery in particular?  As the ban on short selling 
was motivated by the existence of abnormal market conditions, we investigate whether there was an 
improvement in market conditions once the ban was in force. 
In short, we find no strong evidence that conditions in the market for financial stocks were any 
different to conditions for control group stocks in other sectors in the period prior to the ban.  Market 
quality indicators were deteriorating in late August-early September, but they were deteriorating for 
all stocks and not just for financial companies.  Trading costs were rising and despite this trading 
volumes were also increasing for all stocks.  Of course, stock prices were falling at this time and order 
flow was significantly negative as traders aggressively sold stocks, presumably both through due to 
liquidation of long positions and through short sales.  But again, conditions were similar for financial 
                                                          
24
 These results are not reported but are available on request. 
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and non-financial stocks making it hard to justify the intervention by the regulators designed 
specifically to affect only financial sector stocks. 
The effect of the ban on market conditions is quite clear.  Liquidity in the market for financial stocks 
drained away and trading costs rocketed.  Trading volume on the order book fell noticeably at a time 
when volume in stocks not subject to the ban rose.  Critically, we find that the cost of buy orders and 
sell orders increased approximately equally, and that the numbers of market buy and sell orders fell by 
similar amounts.  In other words, the ban raised the cost of trading and reduced the volumes traded 
but did not alter the balance of buy and sell orders.  Order flow remained out of financial stocks 
despite the ban. This suggests that long-sellers were the real drivers of negative sentiment towards 
financial stocks. Moreover, if high selling pressure on financials was the real reason behind the ban, 
its introduction did nothing to alleviate this pressure. 
Other market quality indicators were significantly worse during the ban.  The fall in liquidity resulted 
in higher price impacts following a trade, reduced market efficiency and a smaller price discovery role 
for trading.trades conveyed less information to the market which impeded traders’ abilities to discover 
the true price of financial stocks.  The ban served to make the trading process less rather than more 
informative.   
We demonstrate that the reduction in liquidity and market quality persisted though the relatively long-
lasting ban on short selling in the U.K.  Furthermore we observe strong reversals coincident with the 
lifting of the ban.  Together these suggest that the effects we identify were indeed caused by the ban 
rather than other major market developments such as the introduction of TARP in the U.S. since the 
latter were concentrated in the early days of the U.K.’s ban.   
We can also draw some inferences regarding the behaviour of short sellers from our findings.  At the 
time of the ban, short sellers were often portrayed by commentators as predatory consumers of (bid-
side) liquidity who aggressively sold financial stocks (presumably buying them back later on once 
their prices had dropped sufficiently).  Their removal was thus justified in that it would allow stability 
back to markets as potential buyers of stocks faced reduced risks of being preyed upon.  The academic 
literature, conversely, typically portrays short sellers as more passive (offer-side) liquidity suppliers, 
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willing to sell an asset if its price rises “too far” and so helping to correct over-exuberant markets.  
Removing this type of market participant would only serve to reduce liquidity and worsen market 
quality.  Our findings suggest strongly that the behaviour of short sellers is best captured by this 
second portrayal, even in the volatile last few months of 2008. 
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Data Appendix 
 
Measure Definition 
Spread Bid-ask spread, measured in basis points. 
Slippage Measures as the cost of consuming liquidity with a market sell/buy order of given size.  
Slippage is defined as the difference, in basis points, between the mid price and the 
volume-weighted average price (VWAP) of a trade of given size.  Various size levels 
are examined, ranging from one hundredth of one percent of average daily volume 
(ADV) to one percent of ADV. Separate slippage measures are computed for the buy 
and sell side of the order book. 
Volume Daily number of shares traded divided by the mean number of shares traded in the first 
25 days of the sample. 
Buys/Sells Daily number of shares aggressively bought or sold divided by the mean number of 
shares aggressively bought/sold over the first 25 days of the sample.  Aggressive orders 
are defined as orders that immediately consume liquidity. 
Order flow Signed trade imbalance as a proportion of total shares traded. That is, number of shares 
aggressively bought – number of shares aggressively sold)/(total number of shares 
traded)]×10000. 
Order book 
share 
Proportion of volume traded on the limit order book as a proportion of total volume 
traded on the London Stock Exchange 
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Table 1 
This table lists the 23 stocks in our analysis subject to the short sales ban.  The average market 
capitalisation of each stock calculated over the first half of 2008 is given in the second column.  The 
third column gives the mean market capitalisation of the ten non-financial stocks most similar in size 
that form the control group.  The final two columns give the highest and lowest average market 
capitalisation from the ten control stocks. 
 
Market Capitalisation (£m) 
 
Financial 
Stock 
Mean 
Matched 
Min 
Matched 
Max 
Matched 
Rathbone Brothers 426 427 412 440 
Brit Insurance 711 711 692 730 
Aberdeen Asset Management 901 898 870 934 
Provident Financial 1062 1053 1012 1096 
Close Brothers 1139 1132 1081 1205 
St. James' Place 1204 1212 1144 1262 
Investec 1632 1660 1557 1738 
Schroders 2260 2229 2082 2448 
Alliance Trust 2274 2229 2082 2448 
Admiral Group 2478 2506 2204 2748 
Friends Provident Group 3221 3099 2748 3590 
RSA Insurance Group 4299 4141 3590 4824 
Standard Life 4901 4674 4045 5690 
Old Mutual 6897 6692 5950 7484 
Legal and General 7836 7104 6389 8212 
Prudential 15766 15618 10976 19474 
AVIVA  15789 15618 10976 19474 
HBOS 23311 22947 16376 33420 
Standard Chartered 23417 22947 16376 33420 
Lloyds Banking Group 24476 22947 16376 33420 
Barclays 30313 31019 19211 39166 
Royal Bank of Scotland 37314 31019 19211 39166 
HSBC 92378 50162 29510 103826 
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Table 2 
The table reports results from OLS estimation of the following model with the dependent variable identified in the first column; 
 ฀฀,฀ = ฀+฀ଵ฀฀,฀฀ +฀ଶ฀฀,฀฀฀฀ +฀ଷ฀฀,฀฀ ×฀฀,฀฀฀฀ +฀ସ฀฀,฀฀฀฀ +฀ହ฀฀,฀฀ ×฀฀,฀฀฀฀ +฀଺฀฀,฀฀฀฀฀+฀଻฀฀,฀฀ ×฀฀,฀฀฀฀฀ +฀଼฀฀ +฀฀,฀  
Coefficient estimates are given in each column with t-stats robust to dependence in the residuals both across stocks at a point in time and across time for a 
given stock given in parentheses.  Panel A gives results from headline variables discussed in previous work, panel B presents results from analysis of order 
flows and order book market shares and panel C shows results related to order book depth via our slippage measure. For the slippage results, the percentage 
figure in the row header gives the size of the notional market order for which the slippage is calculated expressed as a percentage of daily average daily 
trading volume. 
 
 Benchmark Financial Pre Financial×Pre Ban Financial×Ban Post Financial×Post Volatility R2 
Panel A: benchmark variables 
Returns -9.08 (0.52) (0.60) 7.99 
(0.46) 
(0.65) -116.55 
(2.45) 
(0.01) -87.47 
(2.27) 
(0.02) -18.08 
(0.44) 
(0.66) -8.71 
(0.35) 
(0.73) 0.66 
(0.02) 
(0.98) -9.68 
(0.18) 
(0.86)   
0.01 
(12.1) 
Spread 19.34 (6.68) (0.00) -0.20 
(0.05) 
(0.96) 2.73 
(2.26) 
(0.02) 0.91 
(0.50) 
(0.62) 15.24 
(4.68) 
(0.00) 17.80 
(2.32) 
(0.02) 11.87 
(4.06) 
(0.00) 7.03 
(1.75) 
(0.08) 0.01 
(1.98) 
(0.05) 
0.12 
(143.3) 
Volatility 8.49 (12.07) (0.00) 0.84 
(0.80) 
(0.42) 8.25 
(3.32) 
(0.00) 23.76 
(1.28) 
(0.20) 31.26 
(3.45) 
(0.00) 14.56 
(1.39) 
(0.16) 9.92 
(5.09) 
(0.00) 24.08 
(2.01) 
(0.04)   
0.02 
(24.5) 
Volume 0.94 (34.75) (0.00) 0.06 
(1.69) 
(0.09) 0.36 
(3.06) 
(0.00) 0.13 
(1.00) 
(0.32) 0.17 
(2.91) 
(0.00) -0.40 
(3.89) 
(0.00) -0.04 
(0.86) 
(0.39) -0.10 
(1.17) 
(0.24) 0.00 
(1.01) 
(0.31) 
0.05 
(55.3) 
Panel B: trading and transparency 
Flow -98.43 (2.18) (0.03) -125.13 
(3.01) 
(0.00) -209.09 
(2.16) 
(0.03) 49.28 
(0.69) 
(0.49) 32.01 
(0.53) 
(0.60) 95.51 
(1.52) 
(0.13) -118.3 
(1.75) 
(0.08) 212.34 
(1.52) 
(0.13) 0.00 
(0.08) 
(0.94) 
0.01 
(12.1) 
OBShare 0.76 (105.7) (0.00) 0.00 
(0.26) 
(0.79) 0.03 
(3.46) 
(0.00) 0.01 
(0.72) 
(0.47) 0.00 
(0.36) 
(0.72) -0.08 
(7.08) 
(0.00) -0.02 
(2.28) 
(0.02) -0.02 
(1.78) 
(0.08) 0.00 
(0.88) 
(0.38) 
0.08 
(104.5) 
Panel C: order book liquidity 
BSlip 
0.01% 9.98 
(6.98) 
(0.00) 0.01 
(0.00) 
(1.00) 1.50 
(2.51) 
(0.01) 0.61 
(0.67) 
(0.50) 8.17 
(4.95) 
(0.00) 10.64 
(2.85) 
(0.00) 6.34 
(4.21) 
(0.00) 4.13 
(2.02) 
(0.04) 0.00 
(2.04) 
(0.04) 
0.15 
(212.0) 
BSlip 
0.10% 13.01 
(10.66) 
(0.00) 1.48 
(0.83) 
(0.41) 4.01 
(8.58) 
(0.00) 2.66 
(3.16) 
(0.00) 13.99 
(10.64) 
(0.00) 38.87 
(5.84) 
(0.00) 9.25 
(6.38) 
(0.00) 10.44 
(4.21) 
(0.00) 0.01 
(2.95) 
(0.00) 
0.36 
(675.8) 
BSlip  
1.0% 79.40 
(10.32) 
(0.00) 40.22 
(1.56) 
(0.12) 41.83 
(5.39) 
(0.00) 17.70 
(2.52) 
(0.01) 98.17 
(10.53) 
(0.00) 214.16 
(4.59) 
(0.00) 20.26 
(4.31) 
(0.00) 86.50 
(3.70) 
(0.00) 0.00 
(0.08) 
(0.94) 
0.25 
(400.5) 
OSlip 
0.01% 9.99 
(6.99) 
(0.00) 0.00 
(0.00) 
(1.00) 1.48 
(2.47) 
(0.01) 0.56 
(0.61) 
(0.54) 8.14 
(4.88) 
(0.00) 10.54 
(2.81) 
(0.00) 6.33 
(4.20) 
(0.00) 4.03 
(1.99) 
(0.05) 0.00 
(2.11) 
(0.03) 
0.15 
(212.0) 
OSlip 
0.10% 13.18 
(10.73) 
(0.00) 1.45 
(0.82) 
(0.41) 4.08 
(8.51) 
(0.00) 2.91 
(2.87) 
(0.00) 14.26 
(9.87) 
(0.00) 38.74 
(6.36) 
(0.00) 9.37 
(6.48) 
(0.00) 10.62 
(4.38) 
(0.00) 0.00 
(0.97) 
(0.33) 
0.35 
(646.9) 
OSlip 
1.0% 96.16 
(9.32) 
(0.00) 88.16 
(2.11) 
(0.03) 56.72 
(4.23) 
(0.00) 26.13 
(0.90) 
(0.37) 131.50 
(7.61) 
(0.00) 316.83 
(3.89) 
(0.00) 10.86 
(1.57) 
(0.12) 72.36 
(1.91) 
(0.06) 0.05 
(2.21) 
(0.03) 
0.19 
(281.8) 
 
Formatted Table
38 
 
Table 6Table 3 
This table reports statistics based on the vector autoregression detailed in eqs (3) and (4).  The price 
impact of a trade is the impulse response of a trade to a trade innovation implied by the VAR.  The 
permanent component of prices, and the trade correlated component of prices are calculated as 
detailed in the text.  Each variable is calculated separately for each period and for each stock in the 
sample.  The figures in the columns represent the simple average of each measure across the relevant 
sample of stocks for the relevant time period.  In Panel A, the full sample of 23 financial firms is 
included, followed by their matched stocks.  In Panel B, only the six largest financial firms and 
matched stocks are included, while in Panel C the 17 smaller financial firms and their matched stocks 
are included. 
 
 Benchmark Pre Ban Post 
 
    
Financial stocks     
 Price Impact 0.47 0.57 0.95 0.81 
 Permanent Component   0.68 0.64 0.37 0.56 
 Trade Correlated Comp. 0.45 0.40 0.24 0.40 
Matched stocks    
 Price Impact 0.47 0.55 0.77 0.80 
 Permanent Component   0.70 0.63 0.54 0.70 
 Trade Correlated Comp. 0.46 0.43 0.38 0.47 
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Table 5Table 4 
The table reports results from OLS estimation of the model below with dependent variable given in the column headings; 
 ฀฀,฀ = ฀+฀ଵ฀฀,฀฀ +฀଴฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀ +฀ଵ฀฀,฀฀ ×฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀ +฀ଶ฀฀,฀฀฀฀ +฀ଷ฀฀,฀฀ ×฀฀,฀฀฀฀ +฀ଶ฀฀,฀฀฀฀ ×฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀ +฀ଷ฀฀,฀฀ ×฀฀,฀฀฀฀ ×
฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀ +฀ସ฀฀,฀฀฀฀ +฀ହ฀฀,฀฀ ×฀฀,฀฀฀฀ +฀ସ฀฀,฀฀฀฀ ×฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀ +฀ହ฀฀,฀฀ ×฀฀,฀฀฀฀ ×฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀ +฀଺฀฀,฀฀฀฀฀+฀଻฀฀,฀฀ ×฀฀,฀฀฀฀฀ +
฀଺฀฀,฀฀฀฀฀ ×฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀+฀଻฀฀,฀฀ ×฀฀,฀฀฀฀฀ ×฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀ +฀଼฀฀ +฀฀,฀  
 
Coefficient estimates are given in each column with t-stats robust to dependence in the residuals both across stocks at a point in time and across time for a 
given stock given in parentheses.  Each trend is set to zero at the beginning of the relevant interval and is incremented by one each trading day. 
 
 
 Spreads BSlip: 0.1% OSlip: 0.1% Buys Sells Volume Flow 
Bench 18.86 (7.21) 16.75 (7.69) 18.12 (7.24) 1.06 (25.44) 1.07 (23.39) 0.06 (1.51) -254.31 (2.65) 
Bench×Financial -0.74 (0.23) 9.16 (1.58) 23.18 (1.55) 0.05 (2.02) 0.05 (2.29) 0.05 (2.15) -242.89 (2.60) 
Bench×Trend bench 0.02 (0.85) 0.24 (9.00) 0.26 (10.10) 0.00 (1.52) 0.00 (2.20) 0.00 (1.94) 4.72 (2.13) 
Bench×Trend bench×Financial 0.01 (1.00) 0.28 (2.16) 0.06 (0.67) 0.00 (0.51) 0.00 (1.22) 0.00 (0.90) 3.57 (1.75) 
Pre 1.92 (0.87) 14.06 (4.27) 18.11 (4.76) -0.13 (1.21) -0.13 (1.31) -0.13 (1.31) -49.77 (0.25) 
Pre×Financial 1.06 (0.33) 8.27 (3.77) 16.95 (3.30) -0.23 (1.97) -0.26 (2.57) -0.24 (2.26) 205.15 (1.71) 
Pre×Trend pre 0.40 (0.98) 3.36 (3.98) 3.23 (3.38) 0.10 (4.42) 0.10 (4.94) 0.10 (4.76) -0.86 (0.03) 
Pre×Trend pre×Financial -0.03 (0.05) 1.96 (0.91) 0.39 (0.30) 0.08 (3.24) 0.08 (3.65) 0.08 (3.40) -8.47 (0.61) 
Ban 13.95 (4.81) 55.60 (8.35) 73.88 (7.07) 0.45 (3.87) 0.40 (3.55) 0.43 (3.75) 156.74 (1.24) 
Ban×Financial 15.58 (2.57) 184.64 (3.23) 162.92 (3.62) -0.55 (4.08) -0.56 (4.78) -0.56 (4.47) 100.92 (0.95) 
Ban×Trend ban 0.13 (1.86) -0.10 (1.25) -0.26 (1.50) -0.01 (5.06) -0.01 (5.12) -0.01 (5.25) 0.79 (0.45) 
Ban×Trend ban×Financial -0.01 (0.07) -0.08 (0.09) 0.74 (1.45) 0.00 (0.30) 0.00 (0.21) 0.00 (0.31) 3.00 (1.50) 
Post 20.30 (2.98) 24.37 (10.25) 24.39 (11.04) -0.14 (1.76) -0.12 (1.43) -0.15 (1.96) 87.85 (0.64) 
Post×Financial 4.21 (0.54) 64.17 (3.86) 60.32 (2.72) -0.10 (0.85) -0.14 (1.17) -0.11 (0.93) 198.44 (0.98) 
Post×Trend post -0.33 (3.63) -0.52 (4.36) -0.52 (5.13) 0.00 (0.50) 0.00 (0.26) 0.00 (0.37) -3.62 (0.55) 
Post×Trend post×Financial 0.00 (0.04) -0.98 (3.96) -1.47 (3.07) 0.00 (0.54) 0.00 (0.90) 0.00 (0.79) 9.40 (1.65) 
Volatility 0.01 (2.12) 0.00 (0.27) 0.01 (0.46) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.05) 0.00 (0.03) 0.02 (0.51) 
R2 0.10  0.26  0.18  0.25  0.29  0.28  0.01  
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Figure 2Figure 1 
Order Flows 
 
Note: the graph plots cumulative daily order flows for financial firms and control group stocks over the entire 
sample period. For a particular stock on a particular day, order flow is defined as 1000 times the difference 
between the  number of shares aggressively bought and the number of shares aggressively sold, divided by the 
total number of shares traded.  
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